

# Constructing broken SIDH parameters: a tale of De Feo, Jao, and Plût's serendipity

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University of Waterloo, 6 November 2020

Joint work with Péter Kutas, Lorenz Panny, Christophe Petit,  
Victoria de Quehen, and Kate Stange

What is this all about?

# Diffie–Hellman key exchange '76


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
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


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


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# Quantum cryptoapocalypse


- ▶ Diffie-Hellman relies on the Discrete Logarithm Problem being **hard**.
  - ▶ Read: taking (discrete) logarithms should be **much slower** than exponentiating.
- ▶ Shor's quantum algorithm solves the discrete logarithm problem in **polynomial time**.
  - ▶ Read: with access to a quantum computer, taking discrete logarithms is **about as fast** as exponentiation.
- ▶ Quantum computers that are sufficiently **large** and **stable** do not yet exist (probably).
- ▶ **But** they are likely to be only a few years away...

# Graph walking Diffie–Hellman?







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It is easy to construct graphs that satisfy *almost* all of these —  
**not enough for crypto!**

Stand back!



We're going to do maths.

## Maths background #1: Elliptic curves (*nodes*)

An **elliptic curve** (modulo details) is given by an equation

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b.$$

A **point** on  $E$  is a solution to this equation *or* the 'fake' point  $\infty$ .

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$E$  is an **abelian group**: we can 'add' points.

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$$(\lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2, \lambda(2x_1 + x_2 - \lambda^2) - y_1)$$

where  $\lambda = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$  if  $x_1 \neq x_2$  and  $\lambda = \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1}$  otherwise.

*do not remember  
these formulas!*

## Maths background #2: Isogenies (*edges*)

An **isogeny** of elliptic curves is a non-zero map  $E \rightarrow E'$  that is:

- ▶ given by **rational functions**.
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**Example #1:** For each  $m \neq 0$ , the multiplication-by- $m$  map

$$[m]: E \rightarrow E$$

is a degree- $m^2$  isogeny. If  $m \neq 0$  in the base field, its kernel is

$$E[m] \cong \mathbb{Z}/m \times \mathbb{Z}/m.$$

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**Example #2:** For any  $a$  and  $b$ , the map  $\iota: (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \sqrt{-1} \cdot y)$  defines a degree-1 isogeny of the elliptic curves

$$\{y^2 = x^3 + ax + b\} \longrightarrow \{y^2 = x^3 + ax - b\}.$$

It is an isomorphism; its kernel is  $\{\infty\}$ .



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**Example #3:**  $(x, y) \mapsto \left( \frac{x^3 - 4x^2 + 30x - 12}{(x-2)^2}, \frac{x^3 - 6x^2 - 14x + 35}{(x-2)^3} \cdot y \right)$

defines a degree-3 isogeny of the elliptic curves

$$\{y^2 = x^3 + x\} \longrightarrow \{y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 3\}$$

over  $\mathbb{F}_{71}$ . Its kernel is  $\{(2, 9), (2, -9), \infty\}$ .

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The **ring** of endomorphisms of  $E$  is denoted by  $\text{End}(E)$ .

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Each isogeny  $\varphi: E \rightarrow E'$  has a unique **dual isogeny**  $\widehat{\varphi}: E' \rightarrow E$  characterized by  $\widehat{\varphi} \circ \varphi = \varphi \circ \widehat{\varphi} = [\text{deg } \varphi]$ .

## Maths background #3: Fields of definition

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For  $E$  defined over  $k$ , let  $E(k)$  be the points of  $E$  defined over  $k$ .

## Maths background #4: Isogenies and kernels

For any **finite** subgroup  $G$  of  $E$ , there exists a **unique**<sup>1</sup> separable isogeny  $\varphi_G: E \rightarrow E'$  with **kernel**  $G$ .

The curve  $E'$  is denoted by  $E/G$ . (cf. quotient groups)

If  $G$  is defined over  $k$ , then  $\varphi_G$  and  $E/G$  are also **defined over  $k$** .

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Vélu '71:

Formulas for **computing**  $E/G$  and **evaluating**  $\varphi_G$  at a point.

Complexity:  $\Theta(\#G) \rightsquigarrow$  only suitable for **small degrees**.

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Vélu operates in the field where the **points** in  $G$  live.

$\rightsquigarrow$  need to make sure extensions stay small for desired  $\#G$

$\rightsquigarrow$  this is why we use supersingular curves!

---

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# Maths background #5: Supersingular isogeny graphs

Let  $p$  be a prime and  $q$  a power of  $p$ .

An elliptic curve  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$  is supersingular if  $p \mid (q + 1 - \#E(\mathbb{F}_q))$ .

We care about the cases  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p + 1$  and  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (p + 1)^2$ .

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Our **supersingular isogeny graph** over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  will consist of:


- ▶ vertices given by supersingular elliptic curves (up to isomorphism),
- ▶ edges given by equivalence classes<sup>1</sup> of 2 and 3-isogenies, both defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ .

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<sup>1</sup>Two isogenies  $\varphi: E \rightarrow E'$  and  $\psi: E \rightarrow E''$  are identified if  $\psi = \iota \circ \varphi$  for some isomorphism  $\iota: E' \rightarrow E''$ .

# Graph-walking Diffie-Hellman?

The isogeny graph looks like this:




$$p = 431$$

Now:  
**SIDH**

Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman

De Feo, Jao, Plût 2011

# Diffie-Hellman: High-level view



# SIDH: High-level view

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- ▶ They both compute the shared secret
$$(E/B)/A' \cong E/\langle A, B \rangle \cong (E/A)/B'.$$

## SIDH's auxiliary points

Previous slide: "Alice somehow obtains  $A' := \varphi_B(A)$ ."


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


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
- ▶ Alice picks  $A$  as  $\langle P + [a]Q \rangle$  for fixed public  $P, Q \in E$ .
- ▶ Bob includes  $\varphi_B(P)$  and  $\varphi_B(Q)$  in his public key.

$\implies$  Now Alice can compute  $A'$  as  $\langle \varphi_B(P) + [a]\varphi_B(Q) \rangle!$

# SIDH in one slide

Public parameters:

- ▶ a large prime  $p = 2^n 3^m - 1$  and a supersingular  $E/\mathbb{F}_p$
- ▶ bases  $(P_A, Q_A)$  and  $(P_B, Q_B)$  of  $E[2^n]$  and  $E[3^m]$



**Attack by:** given public info, find secret key  $-\varphi_A$  or just  $A$ .



# Torsion-point attacks on SIDH

## 'Breaking SIDH' means:

Given

- ▶ supersingular **public** elliptic curves  $E_0/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  and  $E_A/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  connected by a **secret**  $2^n$ -degree isogeny  $\varphi_A : E_0 \rightarrow E_A$ , and
- ▶ the action of  $\varphi_A$  on the  $3^m$ -torsion of  $E_0$ ,

finding the secret key recover  $\varphi_A$ .

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2016 Galbraith, Petit, Shani, Ti: knowledge of  $\text{End}(E_0)$  and  $\text{End}(E_A)$  is sufficient to **efficiently** break it.

2017 Petit: If  $E_0 : y^2 = x^3 + x$  and  $3^m > 2^{4n} > p^4$ , then we can **construct** non-scalar  $\theta \in \text{End}(E_A)$  and efficiently break it.

**But** in SIDH,  $3^m \approx 2^n \approx \sqrt{p}$ .

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- ▶ the action of  $\varphi_A$  on the  $T$ -torsion of  $E_0$ ,

finding the secret key recover  $\varphi_A$ .


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
## From torsion points to endomorphisms

The case of  $E_0 : y^2 = x^3 + x$  and  $T > D^4 > p^4$ :  
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
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
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
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- ▶ We can choose  $\iota \in \text{End}(E_0)$  (for simplicity: of trace zero).
- ▶ Know the action of  $\varphi_A$  (and  $\widehat{\varphi}_A$ ) on the  $T$ -torsion.

## From torsion points to endomorphisms

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


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
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
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
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
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

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2. Reconstruct  $\iota \in \text{End}(E_0)$  with degree  $pa^2 + pb^2 + c^2$  and use that to **compute**  $\varphi_A$ .

# Improvements on torsion-point attacks



- ▶  $D \approx p^\alpha, T \approx p^\beta$ .
- ▶ Below 1-1 dotted line: attacks SIDH group key exchange.
- ▶ Below 2-2 dotted line: attacks B-SIDH.<sup>1</sup>
- ▶ **Polynomial-time attack**, **improved classical attack**, **improved quantum attack**, **SIDH**.
- ▶ Left: our results. Right: your results, if...

<sup>1</sup><https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1145.pdf>

# The equation of death

## Open question:


For  $\sqrt{p} \approx D \approx T$ , and  $p$  large,  
find  $a, b, c, n, \epsilon \in \mathbb{Z}$  with  $\epsilon \approx \sqrt{D^3 p}/T$  such that

$$D^2(pa^2 + pb^2 + c^2) + n^2 = \epsilon T^2$$

in time polynomial in  $\log(p)$ .

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
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
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
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
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- ▶ For  $T \approx D \approx \sqrt{p}$ , like in SIDH, we can do this in time  $p^{1/8}$ .
- ▶ **This is a square-root improvement over the previous best known attack.**



## SIDH is not broken

- ▶ Allowing for attack complexities up to the state-of-the-art, the balance of SIDH is **exactly** at the point where torsion-point attacks give **no improvement**.
- ▶ There are **many** specially constructed starting curves allowing for an attack, but **probably** none help with attacking SIDH proper.
- ▶ One more thing: you can also construct special **base field primes** to get efficient torsion point attacks (. . .which also don't apply to SIDH proper).

# Thank you!

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14681>